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Abstract: To the delight of Westphalian international 
law pluralists, recent decisions by national and re-
gional courts have sharply challenged the authority of 
international organizations and tribunals.  The U.S. Su-
preme Court, in Medellín (2008), rejected the power of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to stick its own 
provisional measures in the wheels of Texan criminal 
justice.  In the famous Kadi case (2008), the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) challenged the 
applicability of Security Council anti-terrorism sanc-
tions for their violation of European fundamental 
administrative justice rights.  More recently (2014), 
the Italian Constitutional Court rejected the ICJ’s 
decision requiring Italy to respect the international 
customary law protection of Germany’s sovereign 
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immunity from civil claims brought in Italian courts. 
Such national disobedience poses a challenge to the 
international constitutionalist ideal, by which state 
compliance with international law is assumed to 
promote human rights and the rule of law. But not all 
expressions of national disobedience to international 
law are homologous, and this paper will defend a 
kind of limited, “civil” disobedience to international 
law, where national fundamental rights, ultimately 
international in character, are at stake.
Key Words: constitutionalism, fundamental rights, 
Jurisdictional Immunities, Kadi, Italian Constitutional 
Court
Riassunto:  Alcune sentenze recenti di corti nazionali e 
regionali hanno contestato l’autorità di organizzazioni 
e corti internazionali. Tale disobedienza nazionale 
mette in dubbio l’ideale del costituzionalismo interna-
zionale, secondo cui la conformità degli stati nazionali 
al diritto internazionale implica un rafforzamento dei 
diritti umani e del rule of law.  Quest’articolo sostiene 
che non tutte delle espressioni di disobedienza nazio-
nale al diritto internazionale sono omologhe, e che tale 
disobedienza potrebbe essere giustificabile, quando 
intrapresa per rafforzare i diritti fondamentali.
Parole chiave: Corte costituzionale, diritto interna-
zionale, costituzionalismo, diritti fondamentali, Kadi 
1 Introduction
Our paradigms of international law vary depending 
upon where we stand. In this paper, I will try to navigate 
between the often nationalistic, Westphalian dualist ap-
proach of my country of origin, the United States, and the 
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more international, constitutional and monistic approach 
of Europe, where I live.  I seek to make sense of recent deci-
sions, by the Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which – contrary to 
this general tendency – take an aggressively dualistic, anti-
constitutionalist approach to international law. I want to 
examine how different they may be, actually and potentially, 
from apparently similar U.S. rejections of international law, 
and to consider what they mean for a constitutionalist ideal 
of international law more generally.
2 Human-centered and state-centered visions 
of international law
Let’s start in Italy, where many citizens suffered serious 
human rights violations by the occupying German forces 
during the Second World War. Germany eventually paid 
reparations to many categories of victims, like prisoners of 
war and Jews. But others, though massacred or deported to 
slavery, never qualified to get any.  One of them, Luigi Fer-
rini, brought a civil suit against Germany in an Italian court, 
asking for damages in compensation for slavery and crimes 
against humanity, which are essentially jus cogens violations. 
Unsurprisingly, the Italian lower courts threw out his case as 
soon as Germany asserted its right to sovereign immunity. 
But, inspired by the Pinochet precedent of the British House of 
Lords, which carved out a jus cogens exception to functional 
immunity, and also by Belgian attempts to displace personal 
immunities according to the same logic, Ferrini persisted 
on appeal, arguing that there was a jus cogens exception to 
sovereign immunity as well. The Italian Supreme Court of 
Cassation finally agreed with him. It gave the lower courts 
leave to hear his case, and empowered them, in another case, 
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to confiscate German property in Italy, in order to satisfy a 
separate judgment against Germany. 
Hoping to put a stop to this, Germany then sued Italy 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violation 
of international customary law in disrespecting its right of 
sovereign immunity. In 2012, the ICJ delivered its decision 
in the Jurisdictional Immunities case.2
In his opinion supporting Italy’s right to disrespect 
German sovereign immunity for crimes against humanity, 
Judge Cançado Trindade put forward a powerfully human-
istic vision of international law and justice. According to this 
vision, the whole point of pursuing an international public 
order is precisely to protect human beings from crimes 
against humanity. States, therefore, do not get to determine 
the content of this ultimate international order. It is instead 
rooted in human rights that are “anterior and superior” to 
them. States can certainly disturb this order. And, in the best 
of cases, they can restore this order too, by paying repara-
tions to victims on their own accord, or at least by enabling 
victims to sue other delinquent states in their courts for civil 
compensation. In promoting this human-centered ideal of 
an international rule of law, the agents of international law 
must challenge states and discipline them; they ought to 
resist states’ arrogant claims of sovereignty. International 
law’s core doctrine, the rule of law, ultimately serves the 
even deeper value of protecting the rights of human beings, 
including the right to justice.3 
2  Jurisdictional Immunities (Germany v. Italy), Judgment, 3 February 2012, I.C.J. 
Reports (2012) 99.
3  Jurisdictional Immunities (Germany v. Italy), Judgment, 3 February 2012, I.C.J. 
Reports (2012) 99, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, ¶150. 
For further articulations of this view, see Cançado Trindade, ‘L’humanité 
comme sujet du droit internacional: nouvelles réeflexions’, 62 Revista da 
Faculdade de Direito da UFMG (2012) 57 and Cançado Trindade, ‘Os tribunais 
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According to Judge Cançado Trindade, the rival, state-
centered view of the international order is a distorted one; 
it rests upon a myth of civilization that poorly conceals the 
violent barbarism lying behind the veil of state sovereignty. 
He writes that myopic “State-centric thinking, to the exclu-
sion of human beings” has had disastrous, catastrophic con-
sequences.4 For this reason, he argues that Italy ought to be 
able to override Germany’s sovereign immunity for “grave 
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian 
law, for war crimes and crimes against humanity…To insist 
on pursuing a strictly inter-State approach in the relation-
ships of responsibility leads to manifest injustice.”5 And, to 
allow States to perpetrate grave violations of human rights, 
and then to get away with them by asserting their sovereign 
immunity, is the very essence of lawlessness.6 State immuni-
ties cannot be contrived to shield states that have committed 
atrocities from paying for the disorder that they have sowed. 
State-centric doctrines of immunity notwithstanding, he 
concluded that Italian courts were right to insist on provid-
ing access to justice for victims of Nazi Germany’s atrocities. 
Judge Cançado Trindade’s human-centered vision of 
international law did not prevail in the final majority decision 
of the ICJ. His opinion was a dissenting one, and he readily 
acknowledges that there lies a wide abyss between its vi-
sion and that put forward in the majority opinion.7 The ICJ’s 
majority decided instead to protect Germany’s sovereign im-
munity, to protect Germany from Italian civil responsibility 
internacionalis contemporâneos e a busca da realização do ideal da justiça 
internacional’, 57 Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFMG (2010) 37. 
4  Ibid., at ¶163.
5  Ibid., at ¶179.
6  Ibid., at ¶219.
7  Ibid., at ¶288.
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for Nazi atrocities. The majority recognized that Germany 
had committed both war crimes and crimes against humanity 
against Italians, on Italian territory no less. But it still denied 
Italian courts the power to bring justice to Italian victims, 
otherwise deprived of other forms of reparation. Looking 
at the practice and opinio juris of States, the ICJ found no 
exception to the right of state sovereign immunity from 
foreign civil jurisdiction, even for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The Court was conspicuously unmoved 
by Italy’s argument that the jus cogens status of Germany’s 
violations ought to override its claim to immunity. The ICJ 
considered sovereign immunity instead as a purely proce-
dural matter. Consequently, a state’s customary law right to 
sovereign immunity cannot be affected by the enormity of 
the crimes motivating the improper jurisdiction. According 
to the majority, there was nothing in the substantive rules of 
jus cogens that entitled Italian victims of German violations 
to seek enforcement and justice.8 The Court thus ordered 
Italy to take measures to ensure that its courts would respect 
Germany’s sovereign immunity. 
What happened next gives us a fine opportunity to re-
flect upon the scope, nature and status of public international 
law, and its bearing upon states. It pushes us to consider the 
value of states’ respect and disrespect for their obligations 
under public international law, and the different modes for 
expressing this. More specifically, the ICJ’s decision, and its 
Italian aftermath, challenge the cosmopolitan, constitution-
alist ideal of international law, which envisions the rightful 
reign of higher, international, universal norms over poten-
tially delinquent and essentially self-interested states. 
8 Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 1, at ¶95.
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3 The international constitutionalist ideal, and 
tensions between its formal monism and 
substantive humanism
The constitutionalist ideal aspires to the progressive 
achievement of an enlightened, post-Westphalian, hier-
archically supreme international law, able to impose real 
constraints upon states. In this proudly internationalist 
view, advanced by such thinkers as the late Antonio Cassese, 
the only conceivable reason that states would “resist inter-
national rules in the name of their sovereign prerogatives 
[is] in order to pursue their short-term national interests.”9 
Constitutionalists see international laws as issuing from a 
beneficent international community. The consensus of this 
community, necessary to enunciate such rules in the first 
place, effectively filters out the less-enlightened, uncivilized, 
anti-humanistic interests; it is assumed able of endorsing 
only rules imbued with a humanistic, human rights promot-
ing content, the best ones for furthering the international 
public good. 
This cosmopolitan view mistrusts state sovereignty, 
for pursuing only short-term parochial interests, and for its 
long association with massive violations of peace, security 
and human rights. It follows from this view that otherwise 
self-interested states have a duty (both ethical and legal) to 
submit to international law. The international order of the 
rule of law and the protection of human rights thus demands 
a critical approach to the supposedly sovereign national 
state, in order to recognize human dignity as the basis of 
9 Cassese, ‘Towards a Moderate Monism: Could International Rules 
Eventually Acquire the Force to Invalidate Inconsistent National Laws?’, in 
A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (2012) 187, 
at 189, 199.
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international law.10 According to the constitutionalist view, 
good cosmopolitan public citizens ought to recognize the 
inherent supremacy of the international order over conflict-
ing state claims. 
In this monistic order, the legitimacy of national law 
depends in fact upon its conformity to international law; 
states are not free to posit competing values. Within the 
international constitutionalist paradigm, there is little room 
for the view that state resistance to international law might 
be a form of civil disobedience, pursued not for short-term 
parochial interest, but in the name of the humanistic values 
underpinning international law itself. In this view, there is 
little hope that national judges might also understand and 
prioritize cosmopolitan values. 
Such international constitutionalism is held up, espe-
cially in Europe, as the antidote to a pernicious U.S. excep-
tionalism. According to this view, the U.S. exceptionalist 
approach to international law is motivated above all by 
a disdain for it.11  The ensuing sense of freedom from the 
constraints of international law helped the U.S. to legitimize, 
at least in its own eyes, such travesties as its unauthorized 
invasion of Iraq and torture of detainees. The paradigmatic 
judicial expression of such Westphalian exceptionalism is the 
10  Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated 
Conception of Public Law’, 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2013) 
605, at 610-11. See also Cançado Trindade, Kant na Haia: a abordagem 
constitucional do direito internacional pela Corte Internacional de Justiça 
(1945-1990), 52 Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFMG (2008) 299 and 
Bodanese Rodegheri, ‘Cosmopolitismo e proteçao internacional dos direitos 
humanos: perspectiva da união europeia e da nedessidade de diálogo com 
os cidadãos’, 66 Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFMG (2015) 457.  
11  See, for example, Glennon, ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, Foreign 
Affairs (May/June 2003). Retrieved March 11, 2016, from https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2003-05-01/why-security-council-failed; 
J. Goldsmith and E. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2007).
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U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas.12 Here, 
the U.S. Court rejected, in the strongest terms, the ICJ’s au-
thority to direct U.S. state courts to review the convictions 
of 51 Mexican citizens, sentenced to death without having 
had proper consular contacts at the time of their arrest. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that under the UN Charter, 
the U.S. had an “international law obligation” to comply 
with the ICJ’s decision in the Avena case.13 But it deflated the 
significance of the international law obligation into some-
thing like a very weak presumption of proper action, easily 
overcome by a state’s change of will. In the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation, Article 94(1) of the UN Charter pro-
vided only that a Member State “undertakes to comply” 
with decisions of the ICJ. And the Court cleverly read this 
“undertakes” as injecting a large dose of state discretion not 
to comply! It had the audacity to locate the evidence for this 
hyper-Westphalian interpretation in Art. 94(2) itself: the UN 
Charter, in reposing the power to enforce ICJ decisions in 
the Security Council, actually gives Member States the op-
tion NOT to comply, and so to take their chances in dodg-
ing Security Council enforcement. And since the U.S. can 
veto any Security Council enforcement measure anyway, it 
clearly could have had no intention to oblige itself to comply 
automatically. 
Not only did the Medellín court greatly privilege U.S. 
state sovereignty over countervailing international obliga-
tions. But it did so in order to displace the serious human 
rights claims – specifically, the temporary reprieve from the 
death penalty – underlying the U.S. and Mexico’s dispute 
over the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.14 In fact, 
12  552 U.S. 491 (2008).
13  Ibid., at 8.
14  A more recent example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s disinterest in 
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Medellín himself was executed by the State of Texas a few 
months after the Supreme Court’s decision extinguished his 
chance of further appeals. 
Insofar as we want to criticize this Westphalian ap-
proach, international constitutionalism appears as a salutary 
check upon a lawless U.S. exceptionalism, just as it does upon 
human rights outlaws in the post-colonial world. But, what 
should happen when the international order that interna-
tional constitutionalism wants to buttress itself privileges 
state sovereignty, or international institutional power, over 
humanistic values? To answer this, we have to disentangle 
the formal aspect of this ideal – international legal suprem-
acy, monism – from its substantive human rights content. 
Which locus of power – the international or national - ought 
to prevail, because it is best equipped to serve peace, security, 
justice and human rights, is not a given. Whether or not the 
commands issuing from the international realm deserve our 
states’ allegiance may or must ultimately depend upon what 
policies and protections they would yield.15 
international norms can be seen in its rejection of President Obama’s 
executive measures to limit carbon emissions and thus enable the U.S. to 
respect the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement (State of West Virginia, et al. v. 
EPA, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 15A773). 
15  See A. Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011), 
at 289, arguing that the “supremacy of international law does not need to 
be understood as blind formalism, but can be construed in substantive 
terms. It cannot be presumed; it has to be earned on substance. The strength 
and persuasive power of the principle of supremacy at the domestic level 
depends of its ability to conform to rule-of-law requirements and to the 
values that international law proclaims.”
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4 Contesting formal international monism in 
the name of substantive humanism: potential 
acts of international civil disobedience by the 
Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union
We can examine this question by looking more closely 
at Italy’s response to its defeat in the Jurisdictional Immunities 
case. At first, Italy bowed, responsibly and unsurprisingly, 
to the state-centered logic of the ICJ decision. Its previously 
path-breaking Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed an 
analogous civil lawsuit against Germany in deference to 
the international court, and signaled to the lower courts that 
they must do the same.16 Parliament enacted Law no. 5 of 
14 January 2013, ratifying the United Nations Convention 
on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property, 
and implementing it into the Italian domestic order. This law 
required the domestic courts to decline jurisdiction in ongo-
ing or future cases when the ICJ has ordered Italy to do so. 
It also empowered the courts to review final judgments in 
previous cases in which Germany’s right to sovereign immu-
nity had been violated.17 But then the Italian Constitutional 
Court, asked by the Tribunal of Florence to reconsider Italy’s 
approach to sovereign immunity, went rogue. 
What did the Constitutional Court do? In its Judgment 
238 of 2014, it broke with the Supreme Court of Cassation, 
16 Corte di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Italy), Judgments no. 32139 of 2012 and 
no. 4284 of 2013.
17 See Fontanelli, I know it’s wrong but I just can’t do right: First impressions on 
judgment no. 238 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (2014), available 
at http://www.diritticomparati.it/2014/10/i-know-its-wrong-but-i-just-
cant-do-right-first-impressions-on-judgment-no-238-of-2014-of-the-italian-
constitutional.html (last visited 3 March 2016).
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and declared the national law implementing international 
sovereign immunity to be unconstitutional. According to the 
Constitutional Court, the law violated the right to justice, 
understood as the right to go to court to vindicate individual 
rights and legitimate interests. The Court interpreted this 
right as a “sacred and irrepressible principle” of the Italian 
constitutional system.18 The supreme constitutional status 
of the right to justice rendered the domestic law pledging 
Italy’s allegiance to the UN in general, and the ICJ in particu-
lar, as well as to the international customary law regime of 
sovereign immunity unconstitutional. The Court observed 
that Germany had committed grave violations of human 
rights. And it decided that to grant Germany sovereign im-
munity from civil justice for these violations, in obeisance 
to international law, would be a disproportionate sacrifice 
of Italy’s core republican values. 
Just like the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in Kadi, of which more later, the Constitutional Court 
asserted the power to review the internal, fundamental rights 
legitimacy of norms originating in the international order.19 
The Italian laws implementing Italy’s adherence to the UN 
Charter, and it obligation to comply with decisions of the 
ICJ (1957) and the International Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunity of States (2012) were thus declared to be uncon-
stitutional, insofar as they obliged Italy to privilege sover-
eign immunity, even in cases for justice for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, over its own fundamental rights.
18 We can ignore for the moment that Italy is the #1 state to be condemned 
by the European Court of Human Rights for the violation of precisely this 
right, to a fair and speedy trial, as set forth in Art. 6.1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
19 Corte costituzionale  (Constitutional Court of Italy), Judgment no. 238 of 2014, 
at § 3.4.
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How much ammunition does the Italian Court’s in-
dependence from international law give to Westphalian 
pluralists or exceptionalists, who contrast with international 
constitutionalists in arguing that the international realm is 
lawless, and rightly so?  To answer that, we must consider 
not only that the Constitutional Court set the Italian state 
up to violate international law.  We must also consider how 
it did so, and the reasons that it marshaled in its defense.  
The Italian Court chose not to engage with the merits 
of the ICJ’s statist interpretation of the law on state sover-
eign immunity.20 It instead made a great gesture of bowing 
before the ICJ’s authority to interpret international law, 
even disclaiming its own power, as a mere national court, 
to review it. The Italian Court even acknowledged that it 
had a duty, both international and constitutional, to imple-
ment international customary law, in conformity with the 
specific interpretation determined by the international legal 
system. In putting forward, however, its own constitutional 
rights-based interpretation of the scope of sovereign im-
munity, the Italian Court asserted its legitimate power as a 
national court to refine the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
And it expressed a hope that it might one day influence in-
ternational customary law.21 In fact, it was national courts 
that had reduced its scope to just atti iure imperii in the first 
place, excluding its protection in commercial cases so as to 
recognize the rights of other contracting parties. It is natural 
that national courts evaluate sovereign immunity, leaving it 
up to international bodies to recognize the state practice at 
the core of an evolving international custom.22
20 Contrast this with the Court of Cassation’s 2012 decision in the Albers 
case, which took issue with the ICJ’s reasoning, but bowed to its authority, 
dismissing the relative case against Germany (Fontanelli, 2013).
21 Constitutional Court of Italy, supra  note 18, at §3.1.
22  Instead, the European Court of Human Rights endorsed the ICJ’s expansive 
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But, despite this internationalist rhetoric, the Italian 
Court’s reasoning was ultimately quite solipsistic. After de-
ferring to the ICJ’s authoritative power to define international 
customary law, the Corte costituzionale asserted its own power 
to have the final say over its meaning in relation to the Italian 
constitution. And it determined the international law norm of 
sovereign immunity, even for crimes against humanity, to be 
extraneous to the Italian legal system, the integrity of which 
is protected by a doctrine of “counterlimits.” This doctrine 
of national constitutional counterlimits to international law’s 
domestic penetration serves to vaccinate the Italian legal sys-
tem against international (experienced as “foreign”) norms 
that would infect its fundamental principles.23 The Court did 
not seriously aspire to see its interpretation resonate beyond 
Italian borders. It did not really try to convince anyone that 
its view ought to inform the international understanding of 
sovereign immunity by undertaking a serious analysis of 
customary law.24 
view of sovereign immunity as unaffected by underlying jus cogens 
violations, in Jones v. U.K. (2014). Judgment 238/2014’s greatest potential 
impact on the development of international law may instead be regressive, 
in weakening the Art. 27 Vienna Convention principle of the supremacy of 
international treaty obligations over conflicting state law, in the name of 
fundamental rights counter-limits to the domestic reception of international 
law. See Mazzeschi, ‘La sentenza n. 238 del 2014 della Corte costituzionale 
ed i suoi possibili effetti sul diritto internazionale’, 9 Diritti Umani e Diritto 
Internazionale  (2015) 23, at 39.
23  Ibid., at §3.2.
24  Fontanelli argues persuasively that the pitfall in the Constitutional 
Court’s reasoning is that its decision “might come to be regarded as a 
comparatively insignificant piece of state practice, that is, one not denoted 
by the international opinio juris necessary for the emergence of customary 
international law.” See also Pavoni, ‘INTERNATIONAL DECISION: 
Implementation of ICJ decisions--sovereign immunity-- international 
crimes--victims’ right to judicial protection--fundamental principles of 
national constitutions--customary international law’, 109 American Journal 
of International Law (2015) 400 at 403.
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While its long-term impact on the specific meaning of 
the international customary law of sovereign immunity re-
mains to be seen, it is not too early to consider its significance 
for the integrity of the monist, universalist, constitutionalist 
ideal of international law. This decision has been roundly 
criticized as a rejection of that ideal, “a high peak of a new 
form of robust dualism.”25 Peters faults the Corte costituzi-
onale for strengthening unilateralism over universalism, giv-
ing “priority to one (state’s) national outlook about what 
constitutes a proper legal order over the universal standard 
pronounced by an international court. Concededly, the ICJ-
standard is unsatisfactory and seems to be biased in favor 
of the inter-state system. On the other hand it still has the 
merit of being universal.” The Constitutional Court’s rigid 
dualism, by contrast, risks “reinforcing the perception that 
international law is only soft law or even no law at all.”26 
Just as bad as the substantive dualism of the Court’s posi-
tion is the aggressively exceptionalist style of its reasoning. 
Fontanelli slams the Constitutional Court for renouncing 
the internationalist reasoning of earlier decisions, which 
asserted a jus cogens-grounded rationale for overstepping 
state sovereign immunity. Instead, it based everything on 
25  Kolb, ‘The relationship between the international and the municipal legal 
order: reflections on the decision no 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional 
Court’, 2 Questions of International Law (2014) 5, at 6, 11. This robust and 
radicalized dualism rejects the value of constructive dialogue between 
national and international courts, and threatens “a shattering schism 
between internal and international law, the former being pitched against 
the second in trying to sterilize its effect,” leading to “ a sort of murder of 
international law through municipal law.”
26  Peters, Let Not Triepel Triumph – How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 
238 of the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order (2014), available 
at http://www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-triepel-triumph-how-to-make-the-best-
out-of-sentenza-no-238-of-the-italian-constitutional-court-for-a-global-
legal-order-part-i/ (last visited 4 March 2016).
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the “untouchable core” of the Italian constitution, appeal-
ing provincially to “the faith of the audience, in a call for 
identitarian exceptionalism.”27 The Court had a rhetorical 
choice, to appeal to a national or to an international public. 
It limited itself, regrettably, to the former. It was neither the 
first, nor the most important, domestic court to do this. 
To justify its bold international law disobedience, the 
Constitutional Court invoked the CJEU’s famous Kadi deci-
sion of 2008.28 The Kadi court had ultimately voided EU norms 
which, while implementing Security Council sanctions, also 
violated European fundamental rights. So, in reviewing the 
internal, fundamental rights legitimacy of norms originating 
in the international order, the Italian Constitutional Court 
claimed to only be following the CJEU’s lead.29 
The CJEU in Kadi, like the Italian Constitutional Court 
that it may have inspired, had also faced robust criticism 
for reinforcing a U.S.-style international lawlessless in the 
long term. According to Weiler, “Kadi looks very much like 
the European cousin of Medellín.”  Its process of severing 
the European norms from their international generators, in 
order to analyze them with reference to European law only, 
“cannot be the correct way in which supreme jurisdictions 
should interact with norms originating from the highest 
27 Fontanelli 2014, supra, note 16. Apologists for the Italian Court’s decision, 
by contrast, compliment it for: its skillful navigation between two highly 
integrated legal orders, ultimately striking a balance between them, rather 
than severing their relationship. See Palombella, ‘The Decision of the Italian 
C.C. 238/2014 on State Immunity and Access to Justice and the Present 
International Law’ (May 4, 2015). Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602193 (last 
visited 4 March 2016).
28 Joined Cases C-402/05 & 415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council and Commission, judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of 3 September 2008.
29 Constitutional Court of Italy, supra note 18, at § 3.4.
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organs of the International Legal Order – withdrawing into 
one’s own constitutional cocoon, isolating the international 
context and deciding the case exclusively by reference to 
internal constitutional precepts…”30
De Búrca has similarly criticized the CJEU for its em-
brace of dualism, thereby attenuating the EU’s relationship to 
international law; it “sits uncomfortably with the traditional 
self-presentation of the EU as a virtuous international actor in 
contradistinction to the exceptionalism of the United States.” 
The Court’s aggressively dualist or pluralist approach to 
international law,
emphasizing the separateness, autonomy, and constitutional prio-
rity of the EC legal order…offers potential encouragement and 
support to other states and polities to assert the primacy of their 
autochthonous values over the common goals of the international 
community.31
The CJEU’s distancing of itself from international law, 
in the name of its own values, makes it seem terribly similar 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.32 
30 Weiler, ‘Kadi – Europe’s Medellin?’, 19 European Journal of International Law 
(2009) 895, at 895, 896. Decision 238 of 2014 has also been criticized for 
reinforcing American style exceptionalist values. Lando, ‘Intimations of 
Unconstitutionality: The Supremacy of International Law and Judgment 
238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’, 78 Modern Law Review (2015) 
1028, at 1036, defends the Italian Constitutional Court against this by 
making the technical distinction that the U.S. relied on a doctrine of the 
non-self-executing nature of Art. 94(1) of the UN Charter, while the Italian 
Court did not. I will argue that the differences between the two run deeper. 
31 De Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order 
After Kadi’, 51 Harvard International Law Journal (2010) 1, at 3, 7.
32 See also Gattini, ‘Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P’, 46 Common Market Law 
Review (2009) 213, at 226-27, who wishes that the CJEU had put human 
rights first by “making rational use of arguments of international law, 
opening itself up to dialogue with other international bodies and tribunals, 
promoting a model of international ‘open network structures’…” By basing 
its valorization of the right to be heard exclusively upon European law, 
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5 International civil disobedience and the inte-
gration of international law
So, what does such an act of international disobedience 
do to the integrity of the monist, universalist, constitution-
alist ideal of international law? I want to suggest that we 
can think of both Kadi and Judgment 238 of 2014 as potential 
expressions of a kind of civil disobedience that could serve 
in the end to reinforce an integrated international law. Ac-
cording to this theory of international civil disobedience, a 
violation of specific international law commands, in service 
to its own higher law of universal humanitarian values, may 
be ultimately justifiable from the perspective of a coherent 
international law itself. We can reframe the core conflict in 
such cases as one between two international norms, rather 
than a conflict between international and domestic law. This 
means that internationally disobedient states, resisting in-
ternational law in the name of fundamental rights, may also 
be able to justify themselves in terms of international law.
Reinterpreting Kadi in this light, we can disentangle 
the CJEU’s violation of the internationalist ideal of Security 
Council compliance from its substantive respect for human 
rights. An international constitutionalist should not hesitate 
rather than the rich body of international human rights, the CJEU furthered 
its own, lamentable “texanization.” Ibid., at 230, fn 61. But see Bradford 
and Posner, ‘Universal Exceptionalism in International Law’, 52 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2011) 1, arguing that the EU is just as exceptionalist 
as the U.S. is. According to them, all states take an opportunistic approach to 
international law, using it to promote their own values and interests, human 
rights and social welfare in the case of Europe, free markets and democracy 
in the case of the U.S. While they might be right to note that powerful states 
insist upon the universalization of their domestic values and interests, one 
could argue that European values may be more universalizable, in that they 
seek to protect the weakest in society rather than liberate the strong to use 
military force and to compete economically.
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to recognize the great merit the CJEU’s decision to bring the 
EU into conformity with universal human rights. So, for 
example, one might credit the CJEU for pushing back dia-
logically against the Security Council, thereby persuading 
it to accommodate some of the human right norms that it 
initially neglected.33 Peters argues that such “constitutional 
resistance” should be regarded with some indulgence.34 
It may look like mere disobedience on the surface, but it 
ultimately challenges the international order to progress 
towards a greater sensitivity to and reception of the human-
istic values at the core of the cosmopolitan constitutionalist 
ideal.35 In the end, the Italian court, like the CJEU, can be 
33 Nollkaemper, supra note 14, at 303 augers that “national institutions can 
protect the rule of law against weaknesses of international law itself. 
Ideally, determining whether or not international acts of law-making or law 
application conform to fundamental rights would be a task for international 
courts. But in the absence of such courts with adequate jurisdiction, national 
courts can provide the missing link by assessing international acts against 
fundamental rights, whether as ‘international norms’ or in the form of 
domestic constitutional rights. Rather than seeing filters set up by an 
active role of national courts as an unwarranted barrier to the full effect 
of international law, such filters may be complementary to the ambitions 
of international law itself. National courts need not be faithful but blind 
enforcers of international law, but may have to fulfil a role as a safety-valve 
or ‘gate keeper’.” 
34 Peters, ‘Are We Moving towards the Constitutionalization of the World 
Community?’, in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International 
Law (2012) 118, at 127. In fact, the CJEU’s position has been reinforced by 
the ECHR in Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland (2013). See also Sheinin, ‘Is the CJEU 
ruling compatible with IL?’, in M. Scheinin (ed.), Terrorism and Human Rights 
(2013) 611, at 620-22, rejecting the “narrative of a conflict between a human-
rights-oriented European legal order and a human-rights-ignorant UN legal 
order.” “Human rights are universal, not ‘European’ in nature. Hence the 
insistence of the European Court of Justice on securing compliance with 
human rights in the implementation of the 1267 sanctions regime is an 
affirmation of, and not a departure from, the imperative of the EU having 
to comply with international law.”
35 Cf. Rosenfeld, ‘Is Global Constitutionalism Meaningful or Desirable?’, 
25 European Journal of International Law (2014) 177, at 197, arguing that it 
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seen as “fulfilling a ‘legitimate’ function in pushing for a 
new interpretation of international law based on its role as 
coauthor of international customary law.36 
It is the presence of this potential substantive overlap 
between national and international fundamental rights that 
ultimately enables us to distinguish Kadi and Judgment 238 
of 2014 from Medellín. It is this potential in grounding an 
appeal to the universal humanitarian values that interna-
tional law exists to serve, that could distinguish the Italian 
and European acts of international disobedience from U.S. 
dualistic Westphalianism after all. These decisions, in real 
contrast to Medellín, have a potential to further an interna-
tional rule of law, grounded in humanistic values. Beneath 
their strongly dualist surface, they may be quietly attuned to 
the constitutional ideal, and specifically to a “soft” or “more 
pluralist” version of it. Sweet’s vision of such a pluralist 
constitutionalism may be constructed out of the intensive, 
rights-based interactions between otherwise autonomous 
legal orders.37 De Búrca’s vision of soft constitutionalism is 
similarly anchored to an ideal of greater dialogical engage-
ment between national and international actors.38
doesn’t make sense to view this case through the lens of constitutionalism 
in the first place. The UN Charter model, based on the superiority of the 
Security Council “may well seem constitutional in form, but in fact comes 
close to being purely political, as no court has the power to review Security 
Council decisions and permanent members of the Security Council have a 
veto power which they can, and often do, use purely strategically. It seems, 
therefore, that in the case of the UN it would be more salutary to avoid the 
constitutional framework than to use it.”
36 Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in 
Creating and Enforcing International Law’, 60 International Constitutional 
Law Quarterly (2011) 57, at 70-71.
37 Sweet, ‘The Structure of Constitutional Pluralism’, 11 I•CON (2013) 491, at 
497.
38 De Búrca, supra note 30, at 39. 
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Still, both the ECJ in Kadi and the Constitutional Court 
in Judgment 238 of 2014 surely could have done more to 
highlight the substantive overlap between the domestic 
fundamental rights that they sought to protect, and inter-
national human rights standards.39 While the substance 
of these decisions may be laudable, their rhetorical style 
clearly provoked the Medellín comparisons that came their 
way.40 While the international constitutionalist ideal will 
shine bright for those identifying with the power and/or 
the values of international institutions, we should not won-
der when national courts gravitate towards a more dualist 
or pluralist or Westphalian ideal of international law; 41 we 
wouldn’t in fact expect national courts to “commit suicide, 
by formally subjugating the national constitutional order” to 
international law, but rather to “assert their own supremacy 
within their own domain, and then to engage in the politics 
of pluralism, including initiating dialogues, both coopera-
tive and conflictual…”42 While we do not have to hope that 
situated national courts will develop a radical empathy for 
international ones, a sound pluralistic judicial politics would 
seem to serve their legitimacy well, in the eyes of both their 
domestic audience and an international one.43 
39 Nollkaemper encourages national courts to move beyond constitutional 
resistance, in order to appeal to international values instead. They could 
then achieve “a productive dialogue” with international bodies, that could 
promote the progressive development of international law.
40 De Búrca, supra note 30, writes that “the ECJ could have insisted on respect 
for basic principles of due process and human rights protection under 
international law…By failing to do so, the ECJ lost an important opportunity 
to contribute to a dialogue about due process as part of customary 
international law, which would be of relevance for the international 
community as a whole and not just the EU.” 
41 Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: the Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law 
(2010), at 23.
42 Sweet, supra note 36, at 497.
43  Kumm, supra note 9, at 612: “National constitutional legitimacy depends, in 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 116 | pp. 443-466 | jan./jun. 2018
464
Looking at all of these cases, we can hope that both 
international institutions and national ones would engage 
with each other in a more cooperative way. Rather than 
compromising their respective legitimacy, such constructive 
engagement might actually enhance it in the long term. If 
international courts seek to reinforce the legitimacy that a 
robust and plausible international constitutionalism affords 
them, they should engage more seriously with the human-
istic claims generating such disputes as that between Italy 
and Germany.44 And not just in their dissenting opinions! 
After Jurisdictional Immunities, the generous cosmopolitan 
view seemed to entail a remarkable, and no longer plausible, 
“faith in the role of international judges for the realization 
of a better world based on peace, respect for human rights, 
and freedom from misery and oppression.” Against the naïve 
constitutionalist ideal, this decision suggests instead that 
international courts are not always the vehicle for advancing inter-
national law towards the goal…[of] the development of the human 
dimension of international law, the minimization of violence, the 
respect of human dignity, and social justice.45 
part, on how the national constitution is integrated into and relates to the 
wider legal and political world…The standards of constitutional legitimacy 
are to be derived from an integrative conception of public law that spans 
the national-international divide.”   
44  Bianchi, Gazing at the Crystal Ball (again): State Immunity and Jus Cogens 
beyond Germany v. Italy’, 4 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2013) 
457, highlights the International Court of Justice’s tendency to preach to 
the converted, to international lawyers who already believe in the Court’s 
enlightened authority. Neither the Judges, nor their audience, are as attuned 
to human rights values as they are to state sovereignty (unsurprisingly, since 
the “overwhelming majority acted in their prior professional experience 
as state’s or international organization’s advisers”). The “reiteration of the 
rites…is a very effective mechanism for ensuring the social cohesion of 
the group and reinforcing the professional and personal identity of its 
members,” but this is hardly likely to move national actors or transnational 
civil society.
45  Francioni, ‘The Ill Fate of ‘Moderate Monism’ in the ICJ judgment 
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International institutions could address these concerns 
more conscientiously, and gain greater legitimacy in the 
process.  It is up to them to reinforce the constitutionalist 
ideal that sustains them. 
So, the Italian Constitutional Court was right to resist. 
States must have a legitimate function in pushing for a new 
interpretation of international law, based on their role as 
coauthor of international customary law. Still, the Italian 
Court should have done so by engaging in a more productive 
dialogue with the ICJ, aimed at promoting the progressive 
development of international law. It could have put forward 
its own thoughtful interpretation of international custom-
ary law, or tried to persuade others of the more universal, 
humanistic value of its position, rather than limiting itself 
to an identitarian exceptionalism. It could have drawn upon 
Judge Cançado Trindade’s rich dissenting opinion for solid 
international law support. 
on The Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’, 23 European Journal of 
International Law (2012) 1125, at 1128-1131. The critique of a naïve 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism as regressive is echoed by Koskenniemi: 
“Constitutionalism responds to the worry about the ‘unity of international 
law’ by suggesting a hierarchical priority to institutions representing 
general international law (especially the United Nations Charter). Yet 
it seems difficult to see how any politically meaningful project for the 
common good (as distinct from the various notions of particular good) could 
be articulated around the diplomatic practices of the United Nations organs, 
or notions such as jus cogens...The debate on an international constitution will 
not resemble domestic constitution-making. This is so not only because the 
international realm lacks a pouvoir constituent but because if such presented 
itself, it would be empire, and the constitution it would enact would not be 
one of an international but an imperial realm.”
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